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INTERPRETING THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
HAS IDEOLOGY TRIUMPHED OVER HISTORY
Thomas Curry*
My presence here today can probably be attributed to the recent
publication of my book entitled Farewell to Christendom.1 Why Chris-
tendom? One reason is that it sounded provocative-a not unimpor-
tant consideration for any author. However, my principal reason for
using the term Christendom is that it provides a basis to compare and
contrast the church-state system we celebrate as one of the great
achievements of the American experience.
What do I mean by Christendom? For me, the term refers to a sys-
tem whereby Christianity, whether in a Catholic, Protestant, or Ortho-
dox form, cooperates with the secular power to provide an overall
view of and direction for both state and society. Christendom is a
phenomenon that came into existence in 313 A.D., after the Emperor
Constantine legalized Christianity in the Edict of Milan and was lim-
ited to those countries where Christianity dominated the religious and
cultural lives of the people. 2 Christendom is not to be confused with
Christianity per se; there were many Christians before the time of
Constantine, but we do not refer to them as belonging to Christen-
dom. There have always been Christians in the Moslem world, but we
would not refer to those Islamic countries as being part of
Christendom.
Christendom is largely associated with the past-particularly with
Medieval Europe. However, as I will discuss with you today, some of
its concepts are still very much in evidence, and some remnants of the
system are still in practice.
* Auxiliary Bishop in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles. B.A. University College, Dublin;
M.A. Loyola University, Los Angeles; Ph.D. Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, CA. This
Article was originally delivered as the Twentieth Annual Lecture of the Center for Church/State
Studies at DePaul University.
1. See generally THOMAS J. CURRY, FAREWELL TO CHRISTENDOM: THE FUTURE OF CHURCH
AND STATE IN AMERICA (2001).
2. For more information on Christendom, see PETER ROBERT LAMONT BROWN, THE RISE OF
WESTERN CHRISTENDOM: TRIUMPH AND DIVERSITY (1996). For more information on the Middle
Ages, see NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES (Harper Perenn ed.
1994).
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I believe there is a tendency to think of Christendom as involving a
union of church and state as contrasted with, our present system,
which is often defined as the separation of church and state, but this is
not something I wish to advance; nor do I believe it to be true. In the
Roman Empire, church and state were united, the Emperor was head
of both and was, in some instances, declared as god. 3 Christians en-
countered trouble precisely because they insisted on a separation be-
tween the legitimate sphere of the Emperor and that which belonged
to God.4 Constantine legitimated that argument by recognizing that
the secular and the sacred spheres were separate and distinct from
each other.5 Neither one had power over the other. Christians were
bound to obey the secular ruler in secular matters, but not in matters
of religion.
Jesus had told his critics to render to Caesar that which belonged to
Caesar and to God that which belonged to God.6 The Constantinian
settlement was, in fact, intended to accomplish that goal. 7 But what
had looked good on parchment proved difficult to implement when it
came to determining specifically what belonged to Caesar and what
was reserved to God. In disputed instances, who would decide? Who
would have the final word? That was the issue that would plague
Christendom, and I will argue that the same issue lies at the root of
the confusion that dominates church-state thinking in America today.
Let me provide a thumbnail sketch of Christendom. It was an ideo-
logical system, by which I mean it was all-embracing, a system that
embraced peoples' lives both as members of a state and members of
society.8 It required-with some exceptions-adherence to both sa-
cred and secular powers. If one was born a member of Christen-
dom-a Christian-one was not at liberty to dispense with adherence
to that religion. Being a member of civil society also involved one as a
member of a religious society, with all the religious and cultural impli-
cations of both societies. The Protestant Reformation did not imme-
diately change that, even though it divided the western world into
3. 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
§ 1:75 (J.B. Bury ed., AMS Press 1974) (1909).
4. Hubert Jedin, Introduction to 1 HISTORY OF THE CHURCH §§ 1:125-137 (Hubert Jedin &
John. Dolan eds., 1980).
5. ROLAND H. BAINTON, EARLY CHRISTIANITY 159-63 (1960).
6. Matthew 22:21.
7. BAINTON, supra note 5, at 159-63.
8. See generally CANTOR, supra note 2.
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Catholic and Protestant parts. The dictum cuius regio eius religio con-
tinued to dominate religion in the years after the Reformation. 9
I describe Christendom as ideological, but by that I do not mean it
was totalitarian. It was indeed an all-embracing system, but total
power was not combined in one authority, as it was in the case of the
Roman Empire. Rather, it was divided between two frequently com-
peting, conflicting, and mutually suspicious spheres-the sacred and
the secular. Indeed, some of the religious authorities, bishops and
popes, were secular rulers as well. However, other secular rulers gen-
erally claimed authority over the religious authorities in the secular
sphere and, to some extent, even in the religious sphere. In Christen-
dom, no single power exercised total control, but, at least in theory,
both powers in cooperation with each other controlled the totality of
peoples' lives.
In practice, both spheres engaged in conflicts with each other with
depressing regularity. Popes deposed Emperors, and Emperors de-
posed Popes. The boundary between the two authorities, what many
in our society refer to as the wall between church and state, was in
constant dispute. Christendom never succeeded in solving this
problem.
The Protestant Reformation did not resolve this dispute, but it did
have a major impact on it; because in a religiously polarized world, if
Protestants and Catholics were to survive, they had to rely on the
backing of sympathetic rulers. As a result, the influence of secular
rulers tended to increase, which led to fewer conflicts with the relig-
ious power.
Let me now fast-forward from Christendom to America in 1789, the
year the United States Constitution was implemented. The framers of
the Constitution abandoned Christendom not because they separated
church and state, but because they abandoned the effort to do pre-
cisely that. They abandoned what I have described as an ideological
approach, belief in a system that embraced all of peoples' lives.
Instead, the framers adopted a contractual concept of government.
For the common good, people surrendered certain rights they pos-
sessed to government, and government received only those rights
given it by the people. Thus, the new government was one of speci-
fied and limited powers. It was limited to what was secular, but not in
charge of all things secular. Its power extended only to those parts of
9. 5 ERWIN ISERLON ET AL., HISTORY OF THE CHURCH 297 (Anselm Biggs & Peter W. Becker
trans., Hubert Jedin & John Dolan eds., 1980).
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the secular world that were enumerated and specified in the
Constitution.
The framers determined that belief lay outside the powers dele-
gated to government. First of all, by prohibiting test oaths, they for-
bade the new government to enforce any belief system, be it religious
or secular. As an American, one is not required to adhere to any
belief, not even to the belief in the sacredness or righteousness of the
Constitution itself.
This is something the United States Supreme Court affirmed and
clarified in the famous second flag salute case of 1943.10 The Court
decided that people could not be required to salute the United States
flag because such a requirement would violate the realm of "intellect
and spirit."11 Similarly, in America no thought or attitude constitutes
treason against the United States. Imagining the "death of the ruler"
is not treasonous as "imagining the death of the king" was in English
law. Rather, according to the Constitution, treason is an "overt act"
that involves "levying war against them, [the United States] or in ad-
hering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. ' 12 Even activity
must be verified by the "testimony of two witnesses. ' 13 One can be-
lieve, as some nineteenth century abolitionists did, that the Constitu-
tion is a compact with the devil and still be a good and loyal
American.' 4
America forsook ideology-an overarching system that embraced
all aspects of life-and solved the problem of the division between
church and state, of what belonged to Caesar and what belonged to
God, by refusing to address it. Instead, it opted for a limited govern-
ment with power over specified parts of the secular world and left the
church to define itself. The state had its own legitimate sphere. All
people and institutions, including the churches, are subject to such le-
gitimate secular authority; but apart from that, they are free to define
themselves-unless, as Thomas Jefferson wrote, "principles break out
into overt actions against peace and good order. ' 15 However, al-
though churches can define themselves, what they cannot do is rely on
or use the jurisdiction of the state to implement religious beliefs or
practices.
10. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
11. Id. at 642.
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
13. Id.
14. GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON (1968).
15. 1 VIRGINIA STATUTE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY
§ 1:126 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 1973).
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When the Constitution was presented to the states for ratification,
sufficient numbers of citizens throughout the new nation were dissatis-
fied by the absence of a specific guarantee as to the new federal gov-
ernment's limitations to warrant a movement for a Bill of Rights. 16
Although everyone agreed that the federal government had no juris-
diction in religion, sufficient numbers of people demanded a specific
statement that the people retained some fundamental rights-includ-
ing the right to religious liberty.1 7 As the Tenth Amendment makes
clear, the government is a limited one of specified powers: "The pow-
ers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people."'18 The Ninth Amendment also recognizes that while the peo-
ple demanded the listing of certain rights retained by them, including
the right to religious liberty, that list is not exhaustive: "The enumera-
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, [i.e., rights not given to gov-
ernment] shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." 19 The free exercise of religion is one of those enumer-
ated rights.20
Thus, the amendments contained in the Bill of Rights-particularly
the First Amendment-are essentially different from subsequent
amendments to the Constitution. In a certain sense, they are not
amendments at all. Amendments change or alter the original Consti-
tution. The Fourteenth Amendment greatly altered the power of the
federal government with regard to the states.21 The Sixteenth
Amendment greatly changed and enhanced the taxing power of the
federal government.22
The First Amendment, however, did not alter the Constitution. It
changed nothing. It simply specified an existing reality-that religious
liberty was a natural right retained by the people and that the new
government had no jurisdiction over it. It begins with, "Congress shall
make no law... "23 Because it prohibited the use of a power that had
not been given, it had no substantive content. It was jurisdictional in
the sense that it denied jurisdiction. It was enacted to reassure the
people of the government's understanding that religious liberty was a
16. LEONARD WILLIAMS LEVY, No Establishment of Religion: The Original Understanding, in
JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 169, 173 (1972).
17. Id. at 173-79.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
19. Id. amend. IX.
20. Id. amend. I.
21. Id. amend. XIV.
22. Id. amend. XVI.
23. Id. amend I.
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natural right reserved to them. Therefore, defining the substance or
the meaning, of religious liberty-or religious coercion-is something
retained by the people.
The historical background I have described-what America in 1789
accepted and rejected with regard to religious liberty-is scarcely evi-
dent today. My perception is that people generally assume the First
Amendment created the right to religious liberty. They tend to see
that liberty as a government guarantee, and to view the courts-par-
ticularly the Supreme Court-as the guarantors and vindicators of this
fundamental American right.
Certainly that is how the courts themselves see the First Amend-
ment. The Supreme Court has given it a very definite substantive con-
tent. It has divided the First Amendment into two "Clauses"-the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause-each with its
own separate purpose and function, which the Court has defined as
follows:
Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they
forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment
upon religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free
Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct gov-
ernmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate di-
rectly to coerce non-observing individuals or not.24
In that pronouncement, the Court adopted a "common sense" defi-
nition of the free exercise of religion, instead of the historical one as-
sociated with the First Amendment. It seems "sensible" to assume
that the Free Exercise of religion means that people are at liberty to
practice their religion of choice, free from government coercion. As
Justice Antonin Scalia declared in 1990: "[Flree exercise of religion
means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever
religious doctrine one desires. ' 25 I take issue with that statement.
The right to believe and profess is a natural right, one not surren-
dered to government. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment is a guarantee that government will not interfere with that
natural right. First and foremost, it is a restraint on government. This
whole relationship has now been reversed and those the Amendment
was enacted to protect the people from have instead become the pro-
tectors. The First Amendment is seen as creating a right!
24. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 221 (1963).
25. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
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Historically, however, free exercise meant something different. The
right to practice or not to practice religion was considered a natural
right, intrinsic to one's birthright. The freedom guaranteed by the
First Amendment was freedom from government interference with
that natural right. In the view of the First Amendment, the threat to
religious liberty comes from government and it is a protection against
government. In the view of the Court, the Justices are the ones who
will decide what constitutes religious liberty or religious coercion. But
the Amendment was enacted to protect people from government, in-
cluding judges. Thus, the very act of deciding that something violates
religious liberty, that some act constitutes religious coercion, is a vio-
lation of the First Amendment in that it involves the Court in a judg-
ment about a religious matter.
The Constitution gives the government power and jurisdiction only
within the secular world. Judges can say what is within the scope of
government, but they are rendered incompetent to go beyond that
and say what constitutes religious coercion. That determination is re-
served to the free exercise of the people. As a religious leader, I may
have opinions on the technical merits of particle accelerators-I do
not-or on hydrogen cells for cars-I approve. However, as a relig-
ious leader, such matters are beyond the scope of my authority. Simi-
larly, what constitutes religious coercion is beyond the scope of
judges. Judges are not neutral in religious matters; they are removed
from the discussion altogether.
The disparity between the First Amendment as enacted and as it is
interpreted today is the difference between seeing freedom as an au-
tonomous sphere free from entry or interference and seeing freedom
as a condition guaranteed by one who comes into my sphere and pro-
claims that he will protect me.
Of course, the First Amendment is a guarantee against religious co-
ercion, against an official religion. What is at stake here is how that
guarantee works. According to the Constitution, if government con-
fines itself to its assigned powers, there will be no official religion,
because one cannot have an official religion without government juris-
diction in religion, and the Constitution assigns it none. Will there be
religious coercion? Probably, if one defines the free exercise of relig-
ion in a way that conflicts with legitimate government jurisdiction, one
will probably experience religious oppression. If my religion man-
dates me to pay no taxes to government, to have plural wives, to drive
on the left-hand side, then I am going to experience coercion. This is
something the Court deals with poorly, and I will come back to this
point shortly. But because judges see themselves as in charge, defin-
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ing the substance of religious liberty, of protecting people from relig-
ious coercion, they have to do a great deal of rationalizing. My point
here is that judges can determine what is within their legitimate au-
thority. People may define some exercise of that legitimate authority
as religiously coercive, but judges may not.
The most grievous flight from the meaning of the First Amendment
occurred in 1947, when Justice Hugo Black, writing for the Supreme
Court, decided to give content to the "Establishment Clause" 26 and
declared that the "Clause" erected, in the words of Thomas Jeffer-
son's metaphor, "a wall of separation between Church and State. 27
Following that metaphor leads one away from one of the great
achievements of the American founders and back to an acceptance of
ideology and the problem that plagued Christendom. As we have
seen, the United States was founded as a government limited to speci-
fied powers but the people retained freedom to determine and define
the rest. The wall metaphor, however, conjures up an all-embracing
system involving church and state, and confers on the government
power to define the boundary between the two. This is an ideological
system. It addresses every aspect of human life and decides whether it
belongs in the sphere of the church or the sphere of the state. It re-
turns to the problem of Christendom, to determining what belongs to
Caesar and what belongs to God. Moreover, in Thomas Jefferson's
letter from which the metaphor is taken, he bases his interpretation of
the First Amendment on a very definite and particular definition of
religion. 28 He stated his belief: "religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God."' 29 Of course, the Court does not declare
what belongs to God. It does not claim control over the church, but it
does claim power to determine its nature, location, and sphere.30
Chief Justice John Marshall famously declared that the "unlimited
power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy."'31 That may or
may not be true, but the power to define is certainly the power to
control.
This is what I call the ideology of America-the idea that the gov-
ernment is in charge of a system embracing our lives-that it sees it-
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164 (1878)).
28. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
29. 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:335 (1950).
30. Philip Hamburger's book, Separation of Church and State, provides a wonderful historical
overview of this subject and a profound insight into the role it has played in American history.
See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002).
31. McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 327 (1819).
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self as endowed with authority to draw a major dividing line between
the church and the state, between the sacred and the secular, and has
drawn the Court away from the American exceptionalism embodied
in the Constitution. The result has been to make the church, rather
than the state, the focus of judicial attention. Because the metaphor
of the wall leads the Justices to the conclusion that they are not only
to define the sphere of the church, but are responsible for seeing to it
that, within that sphere, people experience the free exercise of relig-
ion, they have involved themselves in religion to an extraordinary
degree.
What I am speaking about is the theory that surrounds the Court's
decisions. It hardly matches the practice of the Court at all. That dis-
parity between theory and practice is the source of the confusion that
has progressively engulfed discussion of church and state for more
than fifty years. The concept of the First Amendment as endowing
the government with power to create a wall of separation between
church and state has proven unworkable. First of all, no one knows
what it means. It can neither be described nor defined for America.
Even the Justices who approved its use in 1947 divided bitterly over
the application of the metaphor to the case at hand.32
In practice, the actual metaphor has been abandoned; but the ideol-
ogy, the approach to state and the society it represents, has not. The
Court has continued to see itself not as a body discussing, clarifying,
and determining the limited secular power of the government, but as a
body whose duty it is to evaluate religious issues and decide on and
arrange the proper relationship between the church and the state. In
order to do so, it has to involve itself deeply in religious issues.
In the 1947 Everson v. Board of Education33 case, in which the
Court equated the First Amendment with the wall of separation, it
decided that whether a law aided religion would be the standard for
judgment. 34 It later elaborated that decision into a rule that the "prin-
cipal or primary effect [of a statute] must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion. ' 35 Thus, the Court made itself into an expert on
religion-it knows better than I do what advances or hinders Catholi-
cism! The object of these rules and approaches is entirely religious.
They put the Court in the position of appointing secular judges to
evaluate the effects of laws on the church and religion. In theory, at
32. Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (5-4 decision).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 15.
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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least, the Court may review every law according to a religious stan-
dard-whether it helps or hinders the spread of religion.
What aids or impedes religion is definitely a religious matter, the
right to determine whether something aids or impedes religion is re-
served to the people and forbidden to the government by the First
Amendment. Religion is a country American government may not
visit, and matters pertaining to religion are completely beyond its ken.
One might ask, however: "How can government determine the free
exercise of religion or avoid an establishment of religion if it cannot
describe or define those terms?" My answer is that this very question
is premised on the belief that the terms have content in the context of
the First Amendment, that the presumption is that they are govern-
ment responsibilities. In fact, the opposite is true. Within the scope of
the First Amendment, free exercise is achieved when government ab-
sents itself completely from the subject. How does it absent itself
from what it cannot define? By limiting itself to the secular authority
delegated to it. The original framers did not want to mention religion
because the government had nothing to do with it. The terms used in
the First Amendment are in the Constitution now only as an explicit
warning to government of that understanding of the framers.
Yet, because they have involved themselves so deeply in religious
matters, the Justices must continue to embed themselves more deeply
in confusion. If they are to judge what aids or impedes religion, then
they have to be neutral about religion. "Neutral" is the term that,
perhaps more than any other, dominates decisions at the present time.
The word (or its derivative) appears seventy times in the recent
Zellman v. Simmons-Harris36 decision concerning school vouchers in
Cleveland, Ohio.37
The "neutral" concept is absurd on its face. In a country with such a
range of churches, beliefs, and religious practices, virtually every law
will be seen by some people some place as having an impact on their
belief and practice, as aiding or hindering them. However, because
the Court has returned to what I refer to as an ideology, an all-em-
bracing system for our society, it has immersed itself hopelessly in re-
ligion. If it sees America as divided between church and state,
between the secular and the religious, and itself as defining the proper
spheres of political and religious activity, it has taken on an impossible
role.
36. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
37. Id.
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First of all, life cannot be divided so definitely or neatly between
church and state. Many churches aim to be all-embracing, to influ-
ence people in every aspect of their lives, and to encourage them to
bring their religious attitudes and values to their everyday lives. For
example, a person working in a government social program could see
that work as a "living out" of his or her religious vocation-an exten-
sion of his or her church membership. We cannot draw lines or build
walls through peoples' lives.
For example, the existence of religious or parochial schools flies in
the face of the notion of the separation of church and state. In setting
up religious schools, the church engages in a religious activity, one
that it sees as an essential part of its mission and one that is thor-
oughly religious. For its part, the state accepts this activity as secular,
as performing a public service and fulfilling a mandated state require-
ment-the education of children. This can happen because the gov-
ernment does not impose a theology-a way of thinking. As distinct
from countries that do impose a theology or ideology, America does
not impose a belief system on education. America looks for overt
acts-the ability to read and write-and whether students acquire that
ability by studying religious materials or nonreligious materials is im-
material to the state.
Because the Justices see themselves as administrators of the ideo-
logical system they have adopted, as separating church and state into
their respective spheres, as providing and defending the free exercise
of religion, and as neutral arbitrators to ensure that government
neither aids nor hinders religion, they have assigned themselves
problems as great as those that faced Christendom.
In order to administer this all-embracing system it has created, the
Court has had to assume enormous authority in religious matters. For
example, when a family claimed that providing Social Security num-
bers for its children would violate its religious beliefs, the Supreme
Court declared that the "statutory requirement that applicants pro-
vide a Social Security number is wholly neutral in religious terms. '38
In other words, the Court knew better than the believers what they
believed.
The Court has to resort to such rationalization because it has led
itself into such a bind. It sees itself as providing and defending the
free exercise of religion. Yet if government is to work, it cannot allow
believers to pick and choose what laws they are going to ignore be-
cause to obey them would violate their free exercise of religion. So
38. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986).
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the Court takes it upon itself to decide that such laws are religiously
neutral and therefore do not violate anyone's free exercise of religion.
So what should the Court do? It should begin with the jurisdiction
given to government, if the Court finds that a law is within the limited
and specified jurisdiction of government, then it is a valid law. There
is probably hardly any legislation that will not impinge on someone's
free exercise of religion. However, when the government is exercising
its own proper authority, it is confining itself to its proper sphere and
is not, according to the First Amendment, legislating in religious mat-
ters, because it is incapable of determining what constitutes a religious
matter.
The same approach applies to faith-based initiatives. Government
may contract with religious groups for the performance of secular
functions, for example, caring for addicts and sheltering and feeding
the homeless. The questions the Court needs to ask are, "Will this
contract bring the government into situations and conflicts that a secu-
lar judge may not adjudicate?" and "Will it involve the government in
sponsoring or evaluating the permissibility of religious symbols, or the
recitation of prayers, or other involvements beyond the scope of
courts to judge?" The focus of the Court must be on the limited juris-
diction of government. When government confines itself to that lim-
ited jurisdiction, the people enjoy the free exercise of religion within
the meaning of the Constitution and the First Amendment.
This focus on the limited role of government, the understanding
that the First Amendment is intended to protect us from government
interference-not to confer power on government to supposedly guar-
antee our free exercise of religion-has been overwhelmed by the ide-
ology that has invaded the Court. I will use two recent cases to
further illustrate that ideology.
In 2000, in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,39 the Su-
preme Court refused to sanction student-led prayers.40 The regula-
tions surrounding the prayers involved provisions that they be
"nonsectarian, nonproselytizing, 41 and that "references to particular
figures, such as Mohammed, Jesus, Buddha, or the like would be per-
mitted 'as long as the general thrust of the prayer is non-proselytiz-
ing." 42 Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court
striking down the practice.43 Clearly, the practice would involve gov-
39. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 294.
42. Id. at 296.
43. Id. at 294.
[Vol. 53:1
2003] INTERPRETING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 13
ernment in the exercise of jurisdiction beyond its competence, in eval-
uating religious questions as to what is "nonsectarian,
nonproseletyizing," and how one is to present religious figures in such
a way.
The following year, in Good News Club v. Milford,44 the Supreme
Court held that a school district in New York violated the right of a
Christian group to participate in the use of a school that had been
opened to other community groups for after-school activity. 45 Justice
Stevens dissented, and in his dissent, distinguished three types of relig-
ious speech:
Speech for religious purposes may reasonably be understood to en-
compass three different categories. First, there is religious speech
that is simply speech about a particular topic from a religious point
of view .... Second, there is religious speech that amounts to wor-
ship, or its equivalent .... Third, there is an intermediate category
that is aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a
particular religious faith.46
Ironically, the very Justice who wrote the opinion refusing to allow
a school district to sponsor supposedly nonproselytizing student-led
prayers set himself up as a religious expert, able to determine what
prayer is proselytizing and even what prayers amount to worship.
One could hardly imagine a greater claim to religious jurisdiction by
government.
I believe the Court decided correctly in both instances. It refused
jurisdiction to government agencies in each case-to impose a
majoritarian, supposedly "nonsectarian," prayer on Catholic and Mor-
mon parents using government authority in the first case, or to use
government authority to single out and prohibit the free exercise of
religion by individuals in the second.
However, the dissenters in both cases illustrate the extent to which
ideology has overwhelmed church-state thinking. Dissenters in the
first case represent those who would go back to a form of Christen-
dom-a total system of government, religion, and culture. They
would promote a supposedly noncoercive, nonsectrian religion to
"solemnize" events to promote public morality and decorum. The
Court would sit in judgment as to whether the religion involved was
coercive and whether peoples' free exercise was being violated.
The dissenters in the second case adhere to a somewhat different
ideology-one that would embrace state and society. They would see
44. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 130-35.
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government not just as limited to a part of the secular world, but en-
dowed with power to make the sphere of the state secular-even as
far as the behavior of individuals was concerned. They view their role
as defining and controlling religion and assigning it to the sphere des-
ignated by the state where it may be free. They see themselves in
charge of analyzing, categorizing, and controlling religious activity.
They would forbid not just state-sponsored religion but would pro-
hibit all religion, even that religion engaged in voluntarily by individu-
als and within the realm and reach of the state.
These two ideologies feed off each other and fortify each other by
mutual fear-that one will restore Christendom with an official relig-
ion, or that the other will use the power of government to sweep pub-
lic life free of all expression of religion and impose a regime of
secularism. They masquerade under metaphors that are indefinable:
the "wall of separation" or the "naked public square." Schools are
often battlegrounds wherein one party is trying to impose on children
the religion it thinks will be good for them, and the other is trying to
save the children from the religion it thinks will be bad for them.
Fortunately, the free exercise of religion has been saved by a third
group of pragmatists on the Court. They cannot give a reason for
their decisions because they, too, have bought into the ideology that
endows the Courts with power in religion-to determine what aids
and hinders religion, what is religious coercion, what is neutral in re-
ligion, and that the First Amendment created religious liberty. How-
ever, in practice, they refuse to follow the logic of the ideology that
has overwhelmed the court.
I would like to illustrate this confusion by reading the syllabus of
the decision in the 1989 case County of Allegheny v. ACLU 4 7 dealing
with the issue of displaying a creche and a menorah on public prop-
erty in Pittsburgh:
BLACKMUN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts 111-A, IV, and V,
in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR,
JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts I and II, in which STE-
VENS and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part
III-B, in which STEVENS, J., joined, an opinion with respect to
Part VII, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, and an opinion with re-
spect to Part VI. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, in Part II of which BREN-
NAN and STEVENS, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL
and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concur-
47. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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ring in part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN and MAR-
SHALL, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST,
C. J., and WHITE and SCALIA, JJ., joined.48
If the Court is to connect its decisions with a reasoned, believable
explanation of how it arrives at them, it will need to approach the First
Amendment with a different mindset. This is what I have advanced in
this presentation. We live in the most powerful country the world has
ever known, but the concept of a limited government is still the key to
understanding the meaning of the First Amendment. In the time since
the enactment of the Bill of Rights, the power of the federal govern-
ment has increased immeasurably-to the point whereby it would
possibly be unrecognizable by those who enacted that Bill of Rights. I
would argue, however, that as far as "church and state" is concerned
and as far as the First Amendment is involved, the changes are in
degree, not kind. The federal government at its creation was deprived
of jurisdiction in religious matters-what aids religion, what is neutral
with regard to religion-and it is still deprived of that jurisdiction. No
matter how powerful it has become, it remains limited to a part of the
secular world, and the free exercise of religion is achieved within the
meaning of the Constitution when the government confines itself to
that world.
Focusing on what is secular and within its power will require only a
change in imagination. The ideology promoted by the image of the
wall of separation, the assumption that the government has been en-
dowed with power to separate the church and the state to organize
state and society, has entered deeply into our public discourse. In this
ideology, a system that embraces state and society, the sacred and the
secular, the government assumes a kind of absolutism that is foreign
to the genius and exceptionalism of the Constitution. In his book
With Liberty for All, Professor Phillip Hammond of the University of
California at Santa Barbara writes: "It is not that all Americans must
relinquish their faith in the ultimacy of their religion. It is rather that
the American government-which in governing must judge what is
and what is not religiously permissible-is itself required, by the twin
demands of the Religion Clauses, to remain agnostic. '49
Reviewers of my own recent book have written: "Defining the secu-
lar means, by default, defining the sacred ... . -50 and "In reality, these
48. Id. at 577.
49. PHILLIP E. HAMMOND. WITH LIBERTY FOR ALL: FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN THE UNITED
STATES Xii (1998).
50. Lee Canipe. Farewell to Christendom: The Future of Church and State in America, 44 J.
CHURCH & ST. 590 (2002) (book review).
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[sacred and secular] are two sides of the same coin-any time the state
says that something is secular it is also saying, at the same time, that it
is not religious. Any time that the state says that something is not
secular, it is also saying that it is religious. ' 51
That is the ideology that has engulfed the First Amendment. It is a
political theory and a theology that the sacred and the secular are two
different worlds, and that the government has the power to draw the
boundary between the two. The Amendment then would require the
government to confine what it defined as religious to the sphere be-
yond the wall of its creation.
The genius of what I call American exceptionalism is that it avoided
such ideology. The Constitution endowed the American government
with power over part of the secular world, and the First Amendment
was a reminder to that government to heed that limitation.
Alexander Hamilton warned of the danger inherent in what I have
called the "common sense" interpretation of the First Amendment.
He opposed a Bill of Rights on the grounds that such a bill would only
prohibit the use of a power not granted.52
They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and,
on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more
than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done
which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said
that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power
is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend
that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evi-
dent that it would furnish ... a plausible pretense for claiming that
power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Con-
stitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing
against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the
provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear
implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning
it was intended to be vested in the national government. 53
This is what has happened with regard to the First Amendment. It
involves the prohibition of a power not given, and it sees the free ex-
ercise of religion taking place when government recognizes its limited
powers and confines itself to them. Instead, the Amendment has
come to be interpreted not as a prohibition against government, but as
conferring on government the authority to guarantee religious liberty
to its citizens, to separate church and state and to decide what aids or
51. See THOMAS J. CURRY, FAREWELL TO CHRISTENDOM: THE FUTURE OF CHURCH AND
STATE IN AMERICA, available at http://atheism.about.com/library/books/fulu/aafprFarewell
Christendom.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
53. Id.
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hinders religion, what is religiously neutral, and what constitutes relig-
ious coercion.
We can only recover the genius and exceptionalism of the American.
founders, who rejected ideology, who left the people and not the gov-
ernment, to define what is religious, if we heed that extraordinary ad-
vice provided by Hamilton so long ago.
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